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Author(s): Allen H. Barton

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THE COLUMBIA CRISIS: CAMPUS, VIETNAM, AND THE GHETTO

BY ALLEN H. BARTON

A survey of student and faculty attitudes and behavior at Columbia University following widespread demonstrations and disorders in the Spring of 1968 found that students and faculty divided in roughly equal proportions on the major issues. Only a small minority favored the sit-in tactics of the demonstrators, but majorities favored some of their major stated goals. Police action that ended the sit-ins slightly increased acceptance of the demonstrators' tactics, but did not change attitudes on issues very much. Attitudes toward the crisis were strongly related to over-all satisfaction with the University and to attitudes toward the ghetto and the Vietnam war.

The author is Director of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. This survey was made possible by the support of the Russell Sage Foundation.

IN THE SPRING of 1968 several issues converged on the Columbia campus. The continuing war and the elimination of draft exemptions for graduating seniors and first-year graduate students intensified anti-war activities. These included demonstrations directed against military recruiting and training on campus, the Dow Chemical Corporation, and official University membership in the Institute for Defense Analysis. The University's program of expansion in the Morningside Heights neighborhood was protested by some groups of local residents and also by student sympathizers on the grounds that it deprived poor and black people of housing and reduced the degree of racial and economic integration of the neighborhood. Columbia's plan to construct a gymnasium on land leased from the city in Morningside Park, between Harlem and Morningside Heights, had created several issues: whether the park land should be built on at all, whether the rent to the city was too low, and whether the University's provision of space in the gym for Harlem residents was equitable. Behind these specific issues was a more general feeling, apparently held by an appreciable group of students and faculty, that the structure of the University itself needed overhauling: the administration was too remote, the institution too impersonal.

On Tuesday, April 23, a student rally protesting the disciplining of six leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society for conducting an indoor demonstration against the Institute for Defense Analysis

culminated in the occupation of Hamilton Hall by groups of protesters. Acting Dean Coleman of Columbia College was blockaded in his office. Later that night, demonstrators also broke into the main administration building, occupied President Kirk's office, searched his files, and began copying correspondence that interested them. Dean Coleman was released after a 24-hour siege, but during the following two days three other classroom buildings were taken over by various groups of student protesters.¹

A period of intensive negotiations and discussions followed. The sit-ins developed a "Strike Coordinating Committee," which formulated six demands, including one for complete amnesty for those participating in the demonstrations. Other students mobilized a "Majority Coalition," which threatened counter-action against the demonstrators. The administration called on all concerned to clear the campus buildings, and members of the faculty organized an "Ad Hoc Committee" to mediate between the Strike Committee and the administration.

By the following Monday efforts to solve the dispute had still been unsuccessful, and the administration requested the New York City police to clear the buildings. About midnight a force of over 1,000 police moved into the occupied buildings. Some students left peacefully. Others resisted passively (by going limp and refusing to walk out), while still others resisted more actively (apparently by locking arms and trying to prevent themselves from being carried out). In some cases the police broke through lines of faculty peacekeepers and student sympathizers, and barricades of furniture. There was much confusion, and many nonresisting students were beaten; some police were struck or had things thrown at them. After several hours all the buildings had been cleared and the students, a number with minor wounds, were taken to police stations and booked. Toward four in the morning the police charged a large group of spectators and demonstration sympathizers on the south side of the campus, knocking many down and forcing them against a locked gate. Eventually members of this group left the campus and stood on the street outside, where they were again charged by mounted police.

By Tuesday morning the campus was in a state of outrage against the police action. A general student strike was called, which was respected by most faculty and students to the extent that such classes as met did so outdoors or in offices and not classrooms. The Faculty Ad Hoc Committee effectively went out of business, its mediating

¹ This and the following paragraphs present a bare-bones description including only the background information required to understand the survey being reported.

efforts a failure. An official meeting of the Morningside faculties was called that afternoon. It rejected resolutions either endorsing or condemning the administration's actions, and instead voted to express anguish at the situation, to recommend that disciplinary proceedings growing out of the crisis be handled by a tripartite student-faculty-administration committee, and to create an Executive Committee of the faculties to try to restore peace to the campus and make recommendations for the future.

At this point the Bureau of Applied Social Research decided to undertake a large-scale mail survey of both students and faculty. As pointed out in the letter accompanying the questionnaire, the results were to be made immediately available to all interested groups, as a means of facilitating communication on the campus. Two thousand questionnaires went to the entire Morningside faculty mailing list (excluding Barnard College and Teachers College, which are not formally part of the University). This list included senior faculty, junior and part-time faculty, a small number of full-time administrators, and senior research personnel attached to departments and laboratories. Questionnaires were also sent to a random 20 per cent sample of the student body registered in the College and the graduate and professional schools at the Morningside campus. Except for questions dealing with background information, forms sent to students and faculty were identical.

Within three weeks approximately half of both groups had responded, and the following tabulations are based on these returns. A telephone check on key opinions and experiences among the non-responders was also made. Comparison of early and later returns and of respondents and nonrespondents does not show large differences or any significant trend. The results based on those who returned the questionnaires within three weeks are therefore believed to be roughly accurate for the whole population. Precise figures may be off by five or ten per cent as a result of nonresponse bias, but the general shape of the findings should be correct.

FINDINGS: TACTICS AND GOALS

Only a small minority favored the tactics of the sit-in demonstrators; but a majority favored some of their major stated goals, and advocated wider participation of faculty, students, and neighborhood residents in university policymaking. These conclusions emerged from two very broad questions on goals and tactics, which had also been asked of students during the Berkeley "Free Speech" crisis in 1964 (see Table 1).

Support of the goals was by a 2-to-1 margin among the Columbia

TABLE 1

“Were you for or against the main goals
of the demonstration?”
“Were you for or against the tactics of the demonstration?”

		<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Berkeley Students, 1964^a</i>
<i>Main goals:</i>	For	51%	58%	63%
	Against	31	26	27
	Undecided	18	16	10
		100%	100%	100%
<i>Tactics:</i>	For	10%	19%	34%
	Against	77	68	61
	Undecided	13	13	5
		100%	100%	100%

^a Data provided by Professor Robert Somers; see also “Mainsprings of the Rebellion,” in S. M. Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin, *The Berkeley Student Revolt*, New York: Doubleday. 1965.

students, and by a 5-to-3 margin among the faculty; the student figures are comparable to those at Berkeley in the Free Speech crisis. The tactics, on the other hand, were rejected by overwhelming majorities of both students and faculty, and had the support of only about half as many students as the Berkeley sit-ins.

If the faculty sample is broken down by rank, we find, as shown in Table 2, social stratification operating in a familiar manner: the highest ranks are less favorable to change in the university and to the use of extra-legal tactics to achieve it.

TABLE 2

FACULTY SUPPORT OF DEMONSTRATORS' GOALS AND TACTICS, BY RANK

	<i>Favor Goals of Demonstration</i>	<i>Favor Tactics of Demonstration</i>	<i>Number Responding</i>
Full-time teaching:			
Full Professors	48%	1%	177
Associate Professors	47	5	95
Assistant Professors	64	9	99
Instructors	71	22	53
Part-time teaching: ^a			
Lecturers	61	13	47
Associates	60	11	82
Preceptors	60	15	69
Teaching Assistants	53	15	101
Research and Administration	46	14	193
TOTAL:	51%	10%	916

^a Lecturers and Associates may teach full time, but most do not; Preceptors and Teaching Assistants are all part-time.

The basic tactic was of course the sit-in, which prevented normal use of classrooms and administrative offices. We asked specifically about two tactics that went beyond the simple sit-in: the holding of a Dean prisoner overnight in one of the buildings, and the breaking into and copying of the files of the President (Table 3).

TABLE 3

"How do you feel about the holding captive of Acting Dean Coleman in Hamilton for a day—was it definitely justified, probably justified, probably unjustified, definitely unjustified?"

"How do you feel about the sit-ins examining and copying of President Kirk's files in his office at Low?"

	Faculty			
	All	Full Professors	Instructors	Students
Holding Coleman captive:				
Definitely or probably justified	7%	1%	8%	11%
Examining and copying Kirk files:				
Definitely or probably justified	11	2	19	17

It is clear that only a tiny minority felt these specific tactics were justified. However, it may be considered a measure of the tolerance for militant action that anyone would accept such tactics. Relationship of attitudes to faculty rank was similar to that found in the general tactics question—support went up as rank went down.

Here the importance of *absolute numbers* as compared with *proportions* must be considered. In a referendum or an election, 19 per cent of the vote does not amount to much. On the other hand, 19 per cent of 17,000 students amounts to 3,250 people—a formidable picket line, sit-in group, or crowd. If the remaining 81 per cent are motivated to take counter-action, the result might be a smashing victory for the majority in a pushing match or a fight. But, as long as the majority remain passive, a minority of 19 per cent can completely tie up a campus; while if part of the majority is activated, or the police are called, the minority can turn the campus into a battleground.

The sit-ins proclaimed a list of six demands. Of these, faculty and students gave the strongest support to stopping construction of the gym, creating a joint student-faculty disciplinary committee, and dropping charges resulting from previous gym site demonstrations. The elimination of ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis produced nearly even divisions. The right to conduct indoor demonstrations and the demand for amnesty for those participating in the current demonstrations received only minority support, par-

ticularly the amnesty demand, which the strike leaders had made a precondition for settlement of the dispute.

The issue of basic changes in the university structure was not part of the immediate demands of the sit-in demonstrators, except for the point dealing with student-faculty decision-making on disciplinary action, which, supported by 69 per cent of the faculty and 78 per cent of the students, was the most popular of all the six demands. However, we asked some general questions about student, faculty, and trustee power; the results appear in Table 4.

TABLE 4
"How much decision-making power should students, faculty, administration, and trustees have in making major University policies?"*

	<i>The Most Power</i>	<i>Equal Power</i>	<i>Some Power</i>	<i>No Power but Be Consulted Regularly</i>	<i>No In- fluence at All</i>	<i>No Answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Faculty answers:							
Students should have:	0%	9%	46%	40%	2%	3%	100%
Faculty should have:	28	44	22	1	0	5	100%
Trustees should have:	23	40	24	6	2	5	100%
Student answers:							
Students should have:	.6	23	48	25	1	2	100%
Faculty should have:	22	54	20	1	—	3	100%
Trustees should have:	21	42	22	9	2	4	100%

* The administration was inadvertently left out of the response categories in typing the questionnaire.

Since there is at present no formal mechanism for student participation in decisions on university policies, the results so far suggest that a large student majority supports greater student power. About half of the faculty accept the idea of students having some decision-making power in major university policies, with the rest favoring their being "regularly consulted." Somewhat over 70 per cent of both groups also want the faculty to have at least "equal power" in major university decisions.

Columbia's relations with its neighborhood have presented a vexing and controversial problem in recent years. There are various associations of local residents, there are elected representatives from the districts in which Columbia is situated, and there are city planning agencies, but there does not as yet appear to be any satisfactory

mechanism for handling the relations between the institution and its neighbors. The problem is complicated by the fact that some of the land involved in university expansion is Columbia-owned; other areas involved are privately owned but subject to city-approved urban renewal plans, and both Morningside and Riverside parks are, of course, city property.

Our question on this subject was a rather general one about participation in decisions, and did not try to spell out the mechanisms for such participation or the boundaries of the "community."

About half of the students and over a third of the faculty members answering favored some form of at least equal power for "local residents" in dealing with Columbia's expansion and relocation activities, and a large majority favored giving them at least "some power." However, in the absence of legitimate local governing bodies within the city, for neighborhoods and for larger districts such as Harlem, it is not at all clear how such a desire for joint decision-making could be implemented.

PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INTERVENTION

The great majority of students and faculty believe that the police action involved excessive police violence, although opinions vary about how widespread the violence was.

About 32 per cent of the students and 33 per cent of the faculty members responding were on the campus the night of the "bust." Of those present that night 70 per cent of the students and 54 per cent of the faculty members report that they saw the police hit, push, or charge into groups of people. About half of the students present and about 40 per cent of the faculty present report that they themselves were struck, pushed, or were in groups that were charged at by the police, mainly the latter.

There was very general agreement that at least some excessive force was used by the police; a strong majority of those who were present and saw the force used characterized it as "greatly excessive to the point of brutality" (see Table 5).

We also asked *how many* police, in the opinion of the respondents, had used excessive force, and whether they believed that the demonstrators had used violence against the police. Again, there was a fairly substantial difference between respondents who were on campus that night and those who learned about the events secondhand. Among those who said that they personally had seen force used, 57 per cent of the faculty members and 61 per cent of the students thought that "there was widespread use of excessive violence involving many police." Percentages holding this opinion among fac-

TABLE 5

"From what you have seen, heard, or read, was the police use of force?"

	Faculty			Students		
	Total	Saw Force Used	Did Not	Total	Saw Force Used	Did Not
Reasonable in view of the situation	21%	11%	25%	17%	7%	19%
Somewhat excessive	36	23	40	30	19	36
Greatly excessive to the point of brutality	36	66	28	40	74	41
Don't know	7	0	7	4	0	4
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

ulty and students who did not personally see force used were 23 and 36, respectively. Few faculty or students, whether they were on the campus or not, thought that "there was widespread use of violence by the demonstrators against the police," but about half of the faculty and two thirds of the students believed that "there were isolated incidents of violence by demonstrators against the police." Indeed, of the students who had seen force used by the police, 71 per cent reported that the demonstrators had also engaged in violence.

Those students and faculty who were present and saw the police in action were, to be sure, a highly self-selected group. We constructed an index of predispositions, based on answers to several questions concerning how people felt about the demonstrations and their goals *before* the police action. This index makes it possible to gauge roughly how much self-selection was involved (see Table 6).

If we now compare the proportions who report the use of force as "brutal," holding constant predispositions, we find that the *difference* between those who saw and did not see the police use force

TABLE 6

PER CENT WHO SAW POLICE USE FORCE, BY PREDISPOSITION

Predisposition	Faculty	Students
Anti-demonstration -5	2%	8%
-4, -3	9	15
-2, -1	11	22
Neutral 0	19	26
+1, +2	36	28
+3, +4	44	44
Pro-demonstration +5	54	57

is reduced considerably. It is cut from 38 per cent to 10 per cent among the faculty, and from 33 per cent to 14 per cent among students. There remains a real difference, apparently due to actually seeing the police (as distinct from hearing about them from others or reading about them), but it is not very great, especially when compared to the differences that can be accounted for by predispositions.

REACTIONS TO POLICE INTERVENTION

The effect of the police action was to increase acceptance of the sit-in demonstrations as justified from a small minority to a somewhat larger minority of both faculty and students; but not to change attitudes very much on the major stated issues (see Tables 7 and 8). Respondents were asked to recall their feelings when they first heard of the demonstrations, and then to report their current feelings.

TABLE 7

"How did you feel when you first heard about the occupation of University buildings and offices by the demonstrators—at that time did you feel it was: definitely justified, probably justified, probably unjustified, definitely unjustified, or were you undecided?"
"How do you now feel about the action of the sit-ins?"

	Faculty			Students		
	Before	Now	"Change"	Before	Now	"Change"
Total samples:						
Probably or definitely justified	14%	31%	+17	23%	42%	+19
Probably or definitely unjustified	75	64	-11	63	55	-8
Undecided	11	3	-8	14	3	-11
	100%	100%		100%	100%	
Those who saw police use of force:						
Probably or definitely justified	28%	53%	+25	31%	60%	+29
Those who did not see use of force:						
Probably or definitely justified	11%	24%	+13	16%	33%	+17

Even on the issue of whether police force should ever be used, there is relatively little effect insofar as respondents can recall their prior positions. Only a small minority favored using the police without an attempt at compromise; but there remained an over-all majority of both students and faculty who favored using police under some conditions—either immediately or if the demonstrators refused a compromise solution (Table 9).

TABLE 8

POSITION ON DEMONSTRATORS' DEMANDS BEFORE AND AFTER POLICE ACTION

<i>Per cent Favoring:</i>	<i>Faculty</i>			<i>Students</i>		
	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>"Change"</i>	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>"Change"</i>
Stopping construction of Columbia gym in Morningside Park permanently	59%	64%	+5	60%	61%	+1
All judicial decisions on student discipline to be made at open hearings with due process, judged by a bipartite committee of students and faculty	68	69	+1	77	78	+1
University dropping legal charges against demonstrators arrested at gym site	54	58	+4	56	58	+2
President Kirk and Trustee Burden to sever membership in Executive Board of Institute for Defense Analysis	43	46	+3	48	50	+2
Changing the rule against all demonstrations inside buildings	30	31	+1	39	39	0
No disciplinary action against anyone in the demonstration (amnesty)	15	22	+7	25	30	+5

TABLE 9

POSITION ON USE OF POLICE, BEFORE AND AFTER POLICE ACTION

	<i>Faculty</i>			<i>Students</i>		
	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>"Change"</i>	<i>Before</i>	<i>After</i>	<i>"Change"</i>
Use police without offers of concessions	18%	20%	+2	19%	17%	-2
Use police if sit-ins insist on all demands	48	43	-5	40	34	-6
Police should not be used to get them out	28	31	+3	35	42	+7
Undecided	5	6	+1	6	7	+1
	100%	100%		100%	100%	

The sit-in demonstrators were trying to change university policies by the use of passive force: the physical occupation of buildings essential to the functioning of the university. The goals they professed were widely accepted: a majority of students and faculty felt that there was a need for change in certain policies—particularly the relation of the university to the war and the ghetto—and for change in the decision-making process within the university itself. But in the last analysis the reformist majority was willing to use police against the militant minority in order to prevent minority domination. The demonstrations could raise issues in a highly dramatic way; they could force the university community to confront problems it had been ignoring; but that community did not propose to change from domination by the administration to domination by a radical minority.

The police, however, create their own problems. Police behavior was such that there was a very widespread reaction against them, and against the administration's calling them in when it did. The most immediate outcome of the police action was the call for a general strike of students, which was joined by the heads of a large number of student organizations previously not involved in the demonstrations. Support for this strike was expressed by only a minority of both students and faculty, but among those who saw the police action a majority of both supported the strike at the time they filled out the questionnaire, as is shown in Table 10.

TABLE 10

"Have you been in favor of the general student strike since the police action?"

	Faculty			Students		
	Total	Saw Force Used	Did Not	Total	Saw Force Used	Did Not
Yes	30%	54%	22%	42%	61%	33%
No	60	38	68	48	30	54
Undecided	10	8	10	10	9	13

We know that those who were on the scene when the police came included a larger than average share of those favorable to the demonstrations. When predispositions are controlled, it appears that self-selection accounts for most of the relationship between seeing the police action and supporting the strike among the faculty, and for about two-thirds of the percentage difference among the students. The impact of the police action was thus *not* particularly on those who actually saw it, but was general; it spread to all through talk and the mass media, increasing support for the demonstrators' tactics (Table 7).

One result of the police action seems to have been an eroding of faith in the administration. Only 43 per cent of the faculty and 30 per cent of the students said they believed that, once the demonstration began, the administration had acted in good faith, with another 25 per cent of each group undecided.

It is often said that in situations like the Columbia crisis, the university administration can only lose popularity; whatever it does will make a lot of people unhappy. Sixty-six per cent of the faculty, and 75 per cent of the students, said that the administration had done "a bad job" in handling the crisis.

The most widespread feeling reported was that the administration should have tried further negotiation; however, 38 per cent of the faculty and 28 per cent of the students felt the administration negotiated either enough or too much. Student attitudes were even more critical at Columbia than in Berkeley in 1964 (see Table 11).

TABLE 11

"Do you feel the Administration negotiated: too much, too little, about enough?"

	<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Berkeley Students, 1964</i>
Too much	18%	13%	15%
About enough	20	15	33
Too little	50	58	43
Undecided	12	14	9
	100%	100%	100%

A question about the leadership of the demonstrations, however, suggests that the demonstrators did not gain very much from disillusionment with the administration. Only 14 per cent of faculty respondents and 24 per cent of the students thought that they were acting in good faith, with another quarter of each group undecided.

ROLE OF SATISFACTION WITH THE UNIVERSITY

Attitudes toward the crisis were strongly related to dissatisfaction with the educational content and impersonality of the university. Faculty and students were asked a set of seven questions about general satisfactions and dissatisfactions, which had also been asked in the Berkeley studies.² Responses were formed into a simple score of

² The following questions were asked: "How well satisfied are you with courses, examinations, professors, etc. at the University?" "Taking everything into account, do you think Columbia is a good place to go to school?" In addition, respondents were asked to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: "Some of my classes are so large it is difficult to get anything out of them;" "The problem with Columbia is that it is too big;" "I feel that most of the

basic satisfaction-dissatisfaction, ranging from 0 to 7. the scores for faculty and students both form practically normal distributions, with the greatest number in mid-scale:

		<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Students</i>
Completely dissatisfied	0	2%	3%
	1	7	7
	2	14	16
	3	19	16
	4	19	22
	5	14	18
	6	7	12
Completely satisfied	7	2	6
		100%	100%

Basic satisfactions and dissatisfactions were strongly related to response to the campus crisis (see Table 12). For example, 57 per cent of the most dissatisfied faculty members felt at the time they sent in their questionnaires that the sit-ins were justified, compared with 12 per cent of the most satisfied faculty members.

TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE HOLDING VARIOUS OPINIONS, IN GROUPS FROM LOW TO HIGH IN SATISFACTION

<i>Opinion</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Basic Satisfaction Score</i>					
		0, 1	2	3	4	5	6, 7
When first heard of sit-ins, felt they were justified	Faculty	29	18	13	13	7	12
	Students	32	30	23	16	18	12
Now feel sit-ins were justified	Faculty	57	41	35	25	19	12
	Students	56	49	47	38	34	30
Favor goals of demonstrations	Faculty	75	64	53	43	33	32
	Students	77	71	67	58	55	41
Favor tactics of demonstrations	Faculty	27	12	11	7	6	7
	Students	24	29	19	13	14	8
Sit-ins only effective way to stop gym	Faculty	51	54	47	34	17	23
	Students	57	60	48	46	31	31
Favor general strike since police action	Faculty	58	41	33	22	18	7
	Students	56	56	47	41	35	27
Students should have at least some power in major policies	Faculty	73	54	63	55	39	32
	Students	88	81	76	76	67	60
Now favor stopping gym permanently	Faculty	88	74	65	60	59	48
	Students	65	70	70	64	60	48
Now favor no IDA connections	Faculty	71	56	49	43	32	32
	Students	68	64	60	50	43	36
Now favor amnesty	Faculty	42	24	22	16	19	9
	Students	43	45	30	28	24	16

professors are more interested in their research than in their students;" "In my contacts with the administrative personnel, I have been treated with the consideration a human being deserves;" "The university is an impersonal institution."

IMPACT ON INTRA-UNIVERSITY COMMUNICATIONS

The crisis greatly increased communications within the university, particularly direct, face-to-face talk about university problems. Both faculty and students feel that, whatever else happened, faculty-student relations are better than they were. Events at Columbia differed from most major events experienced by the faculty and students in that they were directly experienced. The crisis was present and visible on campus, not located in Southeast Asia or even down the hill in Harlem. Of the faculty respondents, 94 per cent were on campus on at least one of the eight days from the beginning of the sit-ins to the day after the police action; of the student respondents, 87 per cent had been present on at least one day. (Those not present generally reported that they had deliberately avoided the campus during the crisis period.)

The major source of information about the demonstrations for both students and faculty was "talking with people," checked as one of the three most important sources by 82 per cent of the faculty and 84 per cent of the students. This was followed by the campus radio station, WKCR (checked by 53 per cent of the faculty and 52 per cent of the students), which provided minute-by-minute live coverage from all over the campus and could be heard even by those living in the suburbs, thus linking the scattered Columbia personnel into an instant community. Third most important for the faculty (52 per cent) and fourth for the students (38 per cent) were speeches and meetings—more direct experience. Third for the students (50 per cent) and fourth for the faculty (49 per cent) came the *New York Times*, the normal means by which Columbia people learn about major events on their campus and almost universally read by educated groups in New York City. The *Columbia Spectator*, handicapped by an erratic distribution system (papers are given away at various locations on campus, but one has to find these places and get one while they last), was a less important source, followed by petitions and leaflets, and finally by other newspapers and magazines. In general, it is striking how similar the communications patterns were for students and faculty. This probably reflects the fact that most of both groups live off campus, some in the Columbia area, some in the rest of the city, and some in the suburbs.

The crisis resulted in a greatly increased flow of communications within and between various strata of the university community. Using the method of asking people to recall how things were before the crisis, we asked:

"During this term, but before the demonstrations, how often did you talk seriously, face-to-face, with the following: senior faculty members, junior

faculty members, members of the Administration, members of SDS or other radical groups, residents of Harlem?"

The same question was asked about the time since the demonstrations. The results show a considerable increase in the frequency of face-to-face talk within the faculty, and between faculty and students. The SDS and other radical groups, with whom over half of both students and faculty had not talked previously during the term, greatly increased their conversations with both faculty and students. Conversations with members of the administration became more frequent for faculty members and for students, but about 40 per cent of the faculty and 60 per cent of the students remained untouched by such contacts. Informal communication with residents of Harlem was infrequent before the demonstrations for both students and faculty, and went up only slightly. Cross-tabulations (not given here) indicate that those who directly experienced the police action were particularly affected; the frequency of their discussions with others increased considerably more than that of people who did not see the police action.

When people were asked about the opinions of the demonstrations held by their close friends, before and after the police action, over 40 per cent of faculty and students reported that their friends were split or neutral before the "bust"; this declined to about one-third within each group after the police action. There is thus some evidence that there may be the beginning of polarization, in which demonstration sympathizers at least are becoming surrounded with like-minded people and are not exposed to contrary opinions. This could have serious consequences for the quality of communication within the university.

To assess the effects of the crisis will require long-term study of the situation, but we asked the participants for their immediate judgment. Large majorities of both students (73 per cent) and faculty (63 per cent) felt that the demonstrations have resulted in better student-faculty relations. This is in spite of the fact that, as we have seen, both students and faculty were deeply split in their attitude toward the demonstrations, the necessity of using the police, and the subsequent student strike; and the fact that our respondents do not report any net improvement in intra-student or intra-faculty relations. (About one-third of each group felt that relations were better and the same proportion thought they were worse.) Further analysis of the responses, and perhaps the passage of time, will be required to understand this paradox. Apparently the demonstrations and the events around them did reveal consensus within and between both students and faculty on some major issues: more joint faculty-

student responsibility for discipline, stopping the gym project at least in its present form, and the need for structural change to increase the responsiveness of university policies to faculty, student, and community sentiments.

Out of the conflict came a shared experience, and an increase in "serious, face-to-face talk" about both the differences of opinion and the common concerns of the students and faculty. It is most unlikely that the participants in this serious talking will reach agreement on all issues of university or general social policy. But if they can find a way of living together and continuing the conversation, without actions which outrage and alienate one another, there could indeed be a renewed university. Without the "confrontation," would there have been the conversation? Can the conversation continue, or will confrontation become an end in itself?

THE COLUMBIA CRISIS AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Attitudes toward the demonstrations and their goals were strongly related to attitudes toward the war in Vietnam, but completely unrelated to the draft status of the individual.

Students were asked whether they were eligible for the draft, and if so, what they thought their chances were of actually being drafted in the next year or two. They were also asked whether they had favored United States withdrawal from Vietnam before President Johnson announced he was not running for re-election. We combined these two questions to classify people by their attitude toward the war and their draft status, and examined how each type of student responded to the demonstrations (see Table 13).

TABLE 13
PERCENTAGE FAVORING MAIN GOALS OF DEMONSTRATIONS,
BY ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAM WAR AND DRAFT STATUS

	<i>Chance of Being Drafted 50-50 or More</i>	<i>Eligible but Not Likely to Be Drafted</i>	<i>Men Not Eligible for Draft</i>	<i>Women</i>
Favored U.S. withdrawal	75%	76%	71%	75%
Opposed with- drawal or had mixed feelings	18	29	22	20

Among those who were against the war, about 75 per cent favored the main goals of the demonstrations regardless of their draft status; among those who supported the war or had mixed feelings, only around 20 per cent favored the main goals of the demonstrations. Support of the tactics of the demonstrations was, as we have seen,

far less frequent than support of their goals; but where it existed, it also was found among opponents of the war, and was unrelated to individual draft status. It is thus not true that worry over one's own chances of being drafted was a major factor in the discontent or the special manifestations which it took in the Columbia situation. Generalized unhappiness with the war was important, but this applied regardless of draft status.

The draft is probably not irrelevant to this unhappiness, but it makes everyone unhappy, regardless of their own expectations of being drafted. This is similar to what we have found in studies of ghetto riots: the riots take place almost entirely in areas of high unemployment and poverty, but the employed in those areas are just as likely to participate as the unemployed. The effect of unemployment and poverty is not only on the immediate victims but on the entire ghetto community as well. All are unhappy with the situation, and there is a sense of solidarity, a community climate of resentment and resistance. The cure for the discontent must come by changing the climate of the community, by giving its members believable evidence that major changes are actually happening. This may apply also to student unrest.

On the Columbia campus, 70 per cent of the students and 69 per cent of the faculty responding to our survey were opposed to the war in Vietnam. Only 15 per cent of the students thought that the chances were at least 50-50 of their being drafted in the next year or two. But there may be a sense of solidarity in outrage which affects the entire community, potential draftees and those not eligible alike.

Moreover, the students who opposed the war were also strong supporters of the poor and the black people of the country in their protests. About 75 per cent of those who opposed the war, but only one-third of those who did not oppose the war, agreed with the statement: "I support the idea of the Poor People's March on Washington to achieve more for black people and the poor." About half of the anti-war people, compared with only 20 per cent of those who did not oppose the war, agreed with the statement: "I am in favor of many of the goals of the Black Power movement."

Opposition to the war is thus linked to opposition to poverty and racial injustice at home, and both are linked to demands for change in the university to give students and faculty more say in its policies. In the universities, as in the ghettos, there is a sense that something is wrong with society, and a deeply moralistic demand that something be done about it quickly.

Most of the students want an end to massive American involvement in the Vietnam war, and the use of the resources so freed to end

poverty and slums in America in the near future. These are major changes, but they do not appear in themselves to require any basic restructuring of American society—only a shifting of priorities and resources within the existing system. At this point only a small minority accepts the belief of the radical leaders that these changes cannot be brought about without revolutionary action. What happens in the future depends on whether the affluent majority of older Americans who have so far tolerated war and poverty can respond to these impatient, moralistic young people.

IS A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL OUTLET CLOSING?

The political preferences of the anti-war, anti-poverty majority of students and faculty have so far offered them a legitimate outlet for protest in the larger society, but this may now be foreclosed, with radical consequences.

The two candidates now considered most likely to be nominated for the presidency, Humphrey and Nixon, received little support from either students or faculty. The survey was, of course, taken just before the death of Robert Kennedy. The three most popular candidates were McCarthy, Rockefeller, and Kennedy, in that order (see Table 14).

TABLE 14
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES OF COLUMBIA
STUDENTS AND FACULTY

	<i>Students</i>	<i>Faculty</i>
McCarthy	46%	51%
Rockefeller	21	17
Kennedy	18	14
Humphrey	7	12
Nixon	4	4
Other	4	3
Undecided	10	11
	116% ^a	111% ^a

^a Percentages total more than 100 because some named two choices; 7 per cent of students and 4 per cent of faculty favored *both* McCarthy and Rockefeller; 5 per cent of students and 4 per cent of faculty favored *both* McCarthy and Kennedy.

Choice of candidates is strongly related to the war issue. Among the large anti-war majority, Humphrey and Nixon received virtually no support; the Humphrey and Nixon supporters came mainly from the minority that supported the war or had mixed feelings. Rockefeller drew support from both camps, but more from the "mixed" and pro-war groups (see Table 15).

TABLE 15
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES BY ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

	<i>Anti-War</i>		<i>Mixed Feelings</i>		<i>Pro-War</i>	
	<i>Students</i>	<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Faculty</i>
McCarthy	57%	67%	31%	25%	10%	8%
Rockefeller	17	14	32	27	31	27
Kennedy	21	16	17	11	6	6
Humphrey	3	5	15	18	19	41
Nixon	2	1	11	7	29	21
Other	4	1	2	1	4	2
Undecided	11	9	17	22	16	18
	115% ^a	113% ^a	125% ^a	111% ^a	113% ^a	123% ^a

^a See note to Table 14.

We combined the question about draft status with the question on attitude toward the war, and examined how each type of student felt about various issues, including the election candidates. Again, it turned out that worry over one's own chances of being drafted had nothing to do with support of anti-war candidates.

What will happen if the anti-war majority of students and faculty are confronted with a Humphrey-Nixon campaign this fall? At the time of this survey both Humphrey and Nixon were identified as pro-war candidates. If the candidates maintain these positions into the campaign—and it is very difficult to see how either could become a plausible “peace candidate” in the eyes of the students and faculty—the great majority of Columbia students and faculty, and others like them throughout the country, will be extremely alienated from normal politics.

Some may withdraw in disgust, but the war and the draft of students make it almost impossible for students or professors to retire into their ivory towers. There is a distinct possibility that the massive civil disobedience practiced by a campus minority this spring may be transferred to the national political arena this fall, with widespread support from students and faculty. Massive confrontations and illegal demonstrations against the candidates, the draft, and the war would in turn bring demands for stern enforcement of “law and order,” which would carry the process of alienation further in a vicious circle, widening the “generation gap” and the political division in the country. The effect of alienating a generation of students and a large section of the intellectuals from normal political channels can be very serious both for universities and for nations, as demonstrated in other countries as well as the United States.